The Internet has been developing at a very fast rate in the past two decades. The broadband technology, characterized by a faster speed of delivery of data packets and mostly bundled with other services (i.e. telephone or cable TV), allows network owners to potentially discriminate between content providers. This possibility has evoked a heated debate on "network neutrality" (NN) regulation. The lack of consensus on NN has been reflected by the different responses on the two sides of the Atlantic.
This study focuses on the broadband internet industry on both sides of the Atlantic. An economic framework is set to evaluate the implications of the differences in the institutional and market settings characterizing the two economic areas considered. The goal is to outline policy recommendations for the EU competent authorities. Different instruments and scenarios are considered and evaluated.
Resumen ejecutivo

Internet ha crecido espectacularmente en las últimas dos décadas. La tecnología de banda ancha, caracterizada por un servicio de envío de paquetes a alta velocidad junto con otros servicios, como el teléfono o la televisión por cable, permite a los usuarios y propietarios de la red escoger entre distintos proveedores. Esta posibilidad ha llevado a un acalorado debate acerca de la regulación de la neutralidad en la red. La falta de consenso acerca de esta neutralidad se ve en las distintas posturas adoptadas a un lado y el otro del Atlántico.
Este estudio se centra en la industria de banda ancha de un lado y del otro del Atlántico. Hemos realizado un estudio económico para valorar las diferencias en el mercado de ambas zonas económicas, así como el papel institucional en la regulación de estos mercados. El objetivo es ofrecer recomendaciones a las autoridades competentes de la Unión Europea a través del estudio de diferentes instrumentos y escenarios.
El sector de Internet se compone de un mercado de dos componentes en donde los proveedores de servicios de Internet son meros intermediarios entre los usuarios y los proveedores de contenidos. Así identificamos cinco cuestiones económicas en el debate acerca de la neutralidad de la red: inversión en la mejora de la red e incentivos para los proveedores de contenidos, discriminación cualitativa, integración, cierre de servicio y cogestión en la red. La principal diferencia entre el mercado estadounidense y el europeo es la desagregación del bucle local o lo que es lo mismo, el uso de múltiples operadores de la red de una central telefónica. En este caso, en la Unión
Europea existe una ley de competencia bien desarrollada y una regulación previa. Por ello, las principales preocupaciones deberían ser la discriminación de empresas y una congestión en los servicios. Sería necesario complementar la regulación de estas dos prácticas previas con una política efectiva de competencia, para que dicha regulación neutral de la red no traiga un riesgo de fallos en la regulación.
Introduction
The goal of this report is to illustrate the characteristics of the broadband internet sector in Europe and highlighting the differences with the United States. The Internet is surely one of the most dynamic industries of the last two decades. The broadband technology is characterized by the high speed of delivery of data packets and in most cases it comes bundled with other services (i.e. telephone or cable TV). These features along with some engineering properties of the broadband technology potentially allow network owners to discriminate between content providers. This possibility has evoked a heated debate on "network neutrality" (NN) regulation. The unknown effects of such discrimination seemed to call for a more stringent, ad-hoc regulation. The lack of consensus on the meaning of NN and the practical instruments and effects of the regulation has been reflected in the different responses on the two sides of the Atlantic. The goal of this paper is to summarize the contributions to the debate available at date, evaluate them through an economic framework of reference and, last but not least, outline policy recommendations for the EU competent authorities. The latter goal is achieved by evaluating the different instruments through the possible scenarios the policy maker may have to face in the next future.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 provides an introductory overview of the internet sector. As the internet sector is formalized as a two-sided network, Section 3 summarizes the characteristics and properties of these markets. Section 4 frames the NN debate in terms of the most relevant economic issues raised in the existing literature. Section 5 reviews the structural and institutional differences between the EU and the US sectors. Section 6 analyses and evaluates the policy options available to the European regulator. Section 7 concludes.
An Overview of the Internet Sector
The internet has been perhaps the fastest developing industry in the world in the last two decades. The number of users worldwide has increased at an exponential rate, as witnessed by Figure 1 and Table 1 , but also the penetration rate (i.e. the percentage of users relative to the total world population) has been growing at unprecedented rates. For most people, businesses and institutions, everyday activity would be impossible or prohibitively more difficult without the internet.
The two main economic areas in the developed World, North America and Europe have a penetration rate of 76% and 53% respectively (Figure 2 ). This rate is very likely to keep increasing in the next few years not only because of people's demand for the internet but also due to the recent and continuous technological advances that are making this instrument faster, more reliable and offering access to an even wider variety of applications and services. One of the major recent advances was the affirmation and establishment of the broadband technology as the standard for the future development of the sector. Broadband is often referred to as "high speed internet" and it has distinguishing features: 1) of being provided through infrastructures that also provide other services (i.e. telephony or cable TV); 2) a higher speed of delivery of data packets compared to copper wire technology. The rate of penetration of broadband is still relatively low but a great deal of attention from the policy makers is now concentrated on this measure, as evidence suggests that broadband is an important engine of economic growth and development (Röller and Waverman, 2001 , Litan and Rivlin, 2001 , Gillette, Lehr, Osorio and Sirbu, 2006 , Czernich, Falck, Kretschmer and Woessmann, 2009 .
As broadband appears to be the standard for the internet sector in the years to come, the attention of policy makers, business man, economists, lawyers and a number of institutions focuses on the technology and the rules that apply to it. In this context, NN refers to the concept that all Internet users should have unfettered access to content and services. Google defines «"Network neutrality" (…) an issue that will shape the future of the Internet». The possibility of discrimination allowed by the broadband technology triggers a series of concerns for competition and access that seem to call for an ad-hoc, "network neutral", regulation of the sector. The ultimate goal of such regulation would be to guarantee competition and innovation on the Internet. Therefore, NN regulation will require platforms to be free of restriction and offer the same quality service to all content providers. The possibility of regulations designed to mandate the neutrality of the Internet has been subject to fierce debate. On the one hand stand opponents of NN, such as many ISPs like Verizon Communications, AT&T and Comcast in the US, Telefonica in Spain. They argue that they should be free to provide premium services to differentiate themselves and earn a healthy return, given their large investments on the network. Moreover, if ISPs are not allowed to charge content providers for additional revenues, they will not invest as much to increase the network capacity. They also insist they need flexibility to manage their systems so that high-bandwidth applications such as Bit Torrent don't hog too much capacity and slow down the network for everyone else. For most ISPs today, a small fraction of their users (usually less than 10%) account for most of the use of their networks (usually around 80%). However, this imbalance is not reflected in the subscription rates, even though that small fraction of users generates network management problems that affect the quality of service (QoS) offered to other users. If the QoS can be differentiated, this network management would enable ISPs to correct some of that imbalance, since users (including application, service, and content providers) would decide the QoS of their network directly and pay for prioritizing certain types of services. As a result, their traffic would be treated accordingly. Consequently, the ability to discriminate on the basis of the QoS is an efficient way to deal with excess demand which, in networks, is referred to as "congestion".
On the other hand stand proponents of NN, such as consumer groups and many content providers like Google, Yahoo!, Ebay, Amazon 1 . They argue that the neutrality of the Internet was a key reason for its success as the Internet was originally designed to assign equal treatment and rights of delivery to each and every packet. They believe that platform discrimination will block competition if ISPs offer premium service to their own subsidiaries or if some small content providers are restricted from accessing to the Internet infrastructure. In addition, if every ISP can charge the content provider for the right to access its end-users, the content provider would be charged more, which in turn would reduce the investment and innovation incentives of content providers. Meanwhile, if ISPs are allowed to discriminate and charge content providers additional fees to reach their end-users, it would inevitably lead to the problems of Internet fragmentation, in which content providers who do not reach agreements with ISPs cannot access all customers, and consumers on a single ISP are foreclosed from accessing their content.
The entire debate has evoked a number of interesting questions. From a policy perspective, two issues are of particular interest. First, from the viewpoint of the regulatory agencies, it is necessary to know who benefits from the principle of net neutrality and who does not. Specifically, the policymakers would definitely give support to abandoning net neutrality if it results in an increase in the net social welfare, or more specifically, the end users are better off. Conversely, the fact that only a few private agencies would extract more rent from abandoning the principle of net neutrality would gain much less sympathy. The second issue of interest to policymakers is to check whether there would be more incentives for the ISPs to expand the capacity of their networks and improve the existing infrastructure, which is the key claim of the ISPs, if net neutrality is abolished. For policymakers, this is indeed a key issue. Higher capacity broadband services will facilitate the rapid transmission of large packets such as video services that are favoured by consumers. Furthermore, higher capacity broadband services can help mitigate congestion problems, which can be also reduced by allowing ISPs to charge more for priority in order to ration demand and allow highly valued traffic to experience a better quality of service.
3
Two-Sided Markets and the Internet Sector
In the economics literature, the internet sector is a typical example of a two-sided market. As underlined by Evans and Schmalensee (2007) , this term can be slightly confusing: all markets, in fact, are made of a demand and supply side. The concept of two-sided market, however, hinges on the fact that two groups of agents that can gain from trade, would not be allowed to do so without one or more platform that act as intermediaries between the two groups. The features of the internet can be identified in this simple definition: the internet allows content providers and final users to exchange files, buy and sell goods or services and do much more 2 .
The economic analysis of two-sided markets is one of the major developments of economic theory in recent years and for this reason a schematic introduction to its basic principles is provided in Table 2 3 .
2 Other often cited examples of this type of markets are dating agencies, computer operating systems, entertainment platforms, directory services, credit card payment systems, search engines, shopping malls. 3 Table 3 is based on Rochet and Tirole (2003) , Wright (2004) , Armstrong (2006) , Rochet and Tirole (2006) , Evans and Schmalensee (2007), Armstrong and Wright (2007) . The internet sector is effectively modeled as a two sided market. As the broadband infrastructure is becoming the standard in the industry, telecommunication companies are more and more identified with network owners: they own the infrastructure over which the information flows and these allows the two sides of the market to communicate and trade. On the one hand, final users want to access the internet for a number of reasons: to exchange files with other users, to access online entertainment, to gather important information and to use a number of services provided over the net just to number a few. On the other hand, content providers want to upload their material online to be accessed from users. These are private companies, no-profit organizations, governmental bodies, institutions or private citizens owning a website. Their presence on the internet has many different goals. Heterogeneous is also the importance that their content is accessed rapidly and efficiently. Figure 3 below illustrates the broadband market structure and highlights the fact that network owners charge both sides to access the internet (a and p represents the access fees in Figure 3) . Modeling the internet as a two-sided market is the only way of correctly identifying the effects of the policy instruments evaluated and that may be adopted by the relevant authorities in the near future. Using this perspective, the discussion in the next paragraphs tries to disentangle the effects of pricing and other decisions by platforms on all the agents in the market.
Reality is, of course, more complicated than our extreme simplification. A more detailed schematization of the internet structure is provided by Yoo (2004) . According to Figure  4 , ISPs do not provide direct communication between content providers and final users, but "backbones" act as further intermediaries. Although we address issues that relate to the supply chain in the broadband internet sector, we will largely overlook issues related to the economics of the backbone 4 . Another feature of Yoo (2004) characterization is the presence of two technologies to provide the internet broadband service: the cable modem system and the DSL system. In what follows, however, we shall assume that providing access costs exactly the same to network owners, no matter the technology adopted.
4 A detailed treatment of the economics of backbone providers can be found in Economides (2008) and Economides (2006) . Yoo (2004) Finally, DSL systems are coupled with telephone voice network devices so that internet broadband is often bundled with telephony services. This important issue is also not directly addressed by our review of the theory.
Given these due preliminary clarifications on the approach, we can now introduce the theoretical framework of reference and address the issues of relevance in discussing the broadband sector and the proposals for its regulation.
The Theoretical Framework
Economides and Tag (2009) set a simple two-sided framework to analyse the effects of NN regulation. As in Figure 3 platforms or network owners are intermediaries between content providers and final users: final users choose one platform while content providers multi-home (i.e. sign up on both platforms) in order to diffuse their applications, products and services as much as they can.
Suppose platforms k=1,2 are located at the extremes of a Hotelling linear market: final users then choose to pay the access fee to the platform a k that provides the highest net utility. The indifferent final user is then identified by the consumer located in x such that:
.
1,2
. in which v is the willingness to pay for access, α represents the effects of the network externalities, t is a measure of market power and n e cpk are the expected content providers on each platform. From the previous, the demand functions can be defined:
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k=1,2
. Content providers instead are multi-homing and they decide to participate in the market whenever the fee established by platform k allows them to at least break-even:
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In which An e fk represents the advertisement revenue obtained by content providers reaching a given number of final users, Pk is the access fee established by platform k, f is the fixed cost of entering the market and y is heterogeneous and it is uniformly distributed between content providers. The demand faced by each platform k from content providers is then:
heoretical Framework Economides and Tag (2009) use this model to evaluate two polar situations. The first is the unrestricted duopoly benchmark in which firms compete freely and no regulation is imposed 5 . The second is the situation of "net neutrality" regulation. According to the authors, this is the case when platforms are forced by regulation to choose a zero access fee to content providers. In terms of the model, this corresponds to 0 k p = . This may look like a rather extreme simplification at first; the assumption, however, captures the sense of what according to Lee and Wu (2009) is the crucial issue of the network neutrality debate: should network owners be prohibited from charging a "termination fee" to content providers that benefit of their final users' base? In other words, in the mobile phone industry providers pay each other termination fees in order to connect two users that belong to different networks: should ISPs allowed to do the same or, as many NN proponents suggest, the practice should be prohibited?
The model is relevant for the policy analysis of the broadband industry and should constitute the reference framework. Its main advantage is that it allows evaluating the welfare of users, content providers, platforms and society as a whole and how these change in presence of a proposed regulation. Moreover, its simplicity makes it flexible for the interpretation of several regulatory scenarios.
Investment and Innovation
One of the major concerns in most network industries is the incentives of the incumbent firm (or firms) to invest in maintenance and development of the infrastructure. The internet sector is no exception: investment is crucial given the fast rate technological change and economic expansion of the network. As we shall see, congestion may pose a number of concerns in the years to come as applications developed by content providers and final users demand requires more and more bandwidth day after day. On the other hand, according to many, innovation from content providers is the most important ingredient of the current success of the internet. The number and versatility of applications and contents that are developed on and for the internet are impressive and probably extremely difficult to quantify. "Deregulationists" 6 discourage any intervention as the internet provided incentives for innovation to content providers until now, it will keep doing so in the future. For "openists", however, regulation is needed to preserve in the "broadband era" to preserve the incentives that content providers had in the past. The question is then what policy better suits the incentives to investment and innovation of both parties: also, how is it possible to guarantee that the interests of one party do not squeeze the other? The problem is obviously a complex one but we can try to provide a first answer looking at our reference framework and to other contributions in the literature.
In the model presented above, Economides and Tag (2009) find that regulation increases the profits of the platforms. In other words, in a duopoly situation, a regulation restricting pricing freedom of platforms to content providers reduces competition between the duopolists and leads to a situation of higher profits for platforms, higher welfare for content providers, due to a lower price of access to the internet. Final users, however, are damaged as they face now a higher price of access to the internet.
Caveat 1 The interests of content providers and network owners are aligned. Forbidding "termination charges", i.e. NN regulation, would increase the incentives to improve the network and would allow content providers to profit by developing new and innovative applications.
As Table 3 witnesses, the results recalled seem confirmed by most of the current literature.
Discrimination
The considerations just proposed seem to suggest that network neutrality regulation has many desirable effects, especially for network owners and content providers. The analysis proposed, however, has focused on access to the network and it has largely overlooked issues related to the quality of the service received by content providers and final users when accessing the internet. The quality of access is a key factor in the industry and the fast pace of development of the technology stands to witness this. Hermalin and Katz (2007) and Maiorano and Reggiani (2009) tackle the issue of quality supply and the possibility that content providers can be discriminated according to their willingness to pay for preferential quality of access. Network owners through the In other words, if quality supply and discrimination are relevant dimensions of the competition between ISPs, the results on the benefits of NN discussed in Section 4.1 may be seriously questioned.
Schematic details of the literature are summarized in Table 4 .
Integration and Foreclosure
A relevant issue in markets characterized by competitive bottlenecks, as the internet broadband sector, is whether platforms have incentives to foreclose competitors and monopolize the market. This does not seem an issue on the internet. Suppose a platform wants to foreclose the rival by attracting all content providers. The only way would be to reduce the access fee to content providers; this strategy, however, implies charging more final users. A platform that attracts less final users is then unlikely to benefit from foreclosure: content providers still like to access as many final users as possible and, hence, they are not satisfied by the reduction in participation of final users. ArmstrongWright (2007) suggests that a platform then, instead, could offer to content providers an exclusive contract. Multi-homing content providers have the surplus totally extracted; if a platform offers a small discount they would accept an exclusive contract. This strategy leads to foreclose the content providers' side. Foreclosure, however, is only partial on the other side: not all final users subscribe to the platform that supplies all the content: some may either choose the no content platform or just opt out of the market.
Caveat 3 Partial foreclosure is possible on the internet by offering exclusive contracts to content providers.
The adoption of exclusive contracts naturally leads to the issue of integration along the production chain. The latter is a very common feature of the internet market: many ISPs also provide a number of content and services that are not linked to access to the internet. This feature has triggered a number of concerns regarding competition on the internet. Discrimination at a reduced cost allowed by the broadband technology has strengthened the case for rules that protect the openness and accessibility of the internet. Rubinfield and Singer (2001) and Hogendorn (2005) raise concerns about the anti-competitive potential of integration between content providers and platforms. Their results can be summarized as follows:
Caveat 4 Integration may be beneficial if competition focuses on applications supply (more variety); it provides incentives for discrimination if competition focuses on the speed of connection.
In recent years, especially in Europe, the speed of connection seems the relevant strategic variable on the internet.
Congestion Concerns
The expansion of the internet and the diffusion of bandwidth-intense applications have raised concerns about the adequateness of the current infrastructure to cope with the ever expanding demand. Prioritization and discrimination could result in congestion of the network. Maiorano and Reggiani (2009) suggest how the impact of a network neutral policy that bans quality discrimination may be socially desirable in presence of congestion: quality discrimination increases participation of content providers and consequently of final users, leading to higher traffic. Cheng, Bandyopadhyay and Guo (2010) directly tackle the issue of congestion: in their setting, quality discrimination corresponds to prioritizing packages from content providers that pay for preferential delivery. Their conclusions can be summarized as:
Caveat 5 NN regulation banning prioritization implies a shift of surplus from platforms to content providers; final users and total welfare are mostly unaffected unless platforms are very heterogeneous in their characteristics.
The welfare analysis of the main economic issues characterizing the NN debate will inform the evaluation of the policy instruments that can be adopted to effectively regulate the sector. Before the policy analysis, however, a brief review of the NN debate and of the market and institutional contexts in the US and the EU are in order.
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An Overview of the Network Neutrality Debate: EU vs US
NN Debate in the US
The NN debate originated in the U.S. and is a contentious issue. The current debate can be traced back in 2005 to two specific incidents: a legal case and a regulatory decision by the FCC. The legal case involved Madison River Communications, a broadband provider, which blocked ports used for VoIP applications such as those offered by Vonage as these services competed with the ISP's own telephone service. In March 2005, the FCC investigated "…allegations that Madison River was blocking ports used for VoIP applications, thereby affecting customers' ability to use VoIP through one or more VoIP service providers." Madison River agreed to discontinue the practice. This case was eventually settled with a fine of $15,000 paid by Madison River Communications to the government. However, it sparked the debate over whether network operators are allowed to deny access by final users to specific websites or Internet applications.
On the regulatory respect, the NN debate has become particularly intense after the FCC took the position that cable broadband ISPs could not be required to lease to independent ISPs access to their networks as they were not common carriers. The FCC's decision was upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court in June 2005. This, however, produced a somewhat differential treatment between cable service providers and telephone carriers as the latter were originally required to provide such non-discriminatory access (via DSL facilities) to independent ISPs. The FCC recognized the disparity and later changed the categorization of internet transmission 7 from telecommunication to information services. This implied that the telecommunications common carrier requirements 8 would not apply to Internet services so that network owners were not only able to discriminate but also legally allowed to do so. Although "open access" was not required for network owners, the FCC adopted a policy statement stating its adherence to four principles of network neutrality that Internet service consumers should enjoy: (1) access to lawful content of their choice; (2) ability to run chosen applications and services; (3) ability to connect their choice of legal devices that do not harm the network; (4) competition among network, application and content providers.
9 These principles clearly established the FCC's support for regulation of NN.
In late 2007, an advocacy group file a Complaint alleging that Comcast Corp., the US largest cable company, blocked an online file-sharing service called BitTorrent, 10 as it potentially competes with Comcast's cable TV service. It was argued that Comcast interfered with the Internet rights of its subscribers, and that its practices did not constitute reasonable network management. Several months later, Comcast and BitTorrent agreed to work together to resolve network congestion issues. However, on 20 August 2008, the FCC cited Comcast had violated the Internet policy principles for blocking users from using these peer-topeer applications, and thus ordered the company to stop. The FCC ruled that Comcast's network management practices discriminated among Internet applications and protocols rather than treating all equally; effectively blocked Internet traffic; posed significant risks of anti-competitive abuse; were inconsistent with "an open and accessible Internet"; and that Comcast's failure to disclose its practices compounded the harms. Thus, the FCC actually imposed form of common carrier regulation on ISPs which shows the FCC's clear stance for supporting NN.
Meanwhile, the Obama administration also committed to take swift action towards NN and it is the recent news that the FCC unveiled the proposal of a set of rules aiming at formalizing the existing guidelines. On 21 st September 2009, Julius Genechowski, the Chairman of the FCC announced a major plan to protect a free and open Internet on all wired and wireless networks, thus making good on President Barack Obama's pledge to protect NN. The new principles outlined by Chairman Genachowski in his speech will lay the foundations to ensure that the Internet can remain an emancipatory tool, by prohibiting discrimination of content or applications by ISPs and ensuring that network management practices are transparent.
11 The FCC's announcement puts the U.S. a big step closer to enforcing NN.
However, when all seem positive towards binding the regulation of NN, very recently, the ongoing dispute over NN was dealt a serious blow when Comcast Corp. achieved a big win on 6 th April 2010 as the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia overturned the FCC's August 2008 ruling forcing Comcast to abandon its network management efforts aimed at users of the BitTorrent peer-to-peer service and other applications. The Court ruled that the FCC lacks authority to enforce network neutrality rules and require broadband providers to give equal treatment to all Internet traffic flowing over their networks. This was a big victory for Comcast Corp., which, without any doubt, had challenged the FCC's authority to impose such NN obligations on broadband providers. 12 The decision of the federal court against the FCC is far-reaching as it threw the future of Internet regulations and U.S. broadband expansion plans into doubt. The FCC has admitted that the "decision may affect a significant number of important plan recommendations".
NN Debate in the EU
The debate over NN in the U.S. extended internationally, due to the global nature of many Internet services. It has also become a heated topic recently in the EU but the debate does not seem as intense as in the US so far.
The European Commission has committed to take active action to legislate on NN. The principles of the EU telecoms reform approved in November 2009 by the European Parliament seem to be the ban of unfair discrimination as abuse of dominant position, imposing a minimum quality standard of services and transparency over the possible restrictions imposed on the networks users. On 23 November 2009, the European Commission released the declaration on NN added to the telecoms reform package. "The Commission attaches high importance to preserving the open and neutral character of the Internet, taking full account of the will of the co-legislators now to enshrine net neutrality as a policy objective and regulatory principle to be promoted by national regulatory authorities, alongside the strengthening of related transparency requirements and the creation of safeguard powers for national regulatory authorities to prevent the degradation of services and the hindering or slowing down of traffic over public networks".
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On 30 June 2010, a public consultation on the issue of NN was launched. Neelie Kroes, Commissioner for the Digital Agenda, intended to report back to the European Parliament before the end of the year whether regulatory action on NN was necessary. In addition, the recently created Body of European Regulators for Electronic Communications (BEREC), which brings together the national regulatory authorities of E.U. member states, has already set up a project team to work on NN issues.
In the UK, NN seems to have finally caught on. The arguments have mostly been about how far ISPs should be allowed to go in throttling the BBC's hugely popular iPlayer application. The rapidly increasing usage of the BBC's iPlayer has ISPs complaining as at least one company has reported that traffic for streaming video has doubled since the BBC officially introduced the iPlayer in late December of 2007. Some UK ISPs called for the BBC to pay up as iPlayer takes up more of their customers' total bandwidth consumption. Others want the regulator to step in.
14 In 2009, the BBC accused BT of "throttling" download speeds for its iPlayer service, while BT said that content providers should not expect a "free ride". However, UK regulators do not appear concerned about NN. According to Ofcom, the UK's telecoms regulator, there is currently no need to introduce NN legislation as they believe there is more access competition in the UK which means a regulator can let the market sort out the issue itself. These are the preliminary views expressed by Ofcom in a discussion document published in June 2010 for consultation. ofcom.org.uk/binaries/consultations/net-neutrality/summary/netneutrality.pdf.
In Spain, in November 2009, the mobile operator Vodafone launched a new offer that violated the fundamental principle of NN. It announced that it would prioritize Internet access for its mobile subscribers who were ready to pay an extra fee when the 3G network was congested. 16 This means that instead of equally sharing the network capacity between all users, Vodafone will discriminate against the subscribers who do not pay the extra fee, and deliberately slow them down. Following that in February 2010, Mr. Cesar Alierta, CEO of telecommunications and Internet service provider Telefonica, made the following statements: "It is evident that Internet search engines use our networks without paying us anything, which is good for them and a disgrace for us"…… "This cannot continue, we set up the networks (…) we do everything. This will change, I am sure". Then in a meeting at Bilbao, Spain, Cesar Alierta expressed that his company would charge Google and other search engines for the use of their network. However, Spanish telecommunications regulator CMT's chairman, Reinaldo Rodriguez, expressed his views in April 2010 that there is no justification in forcing Google to share its revenues with Telefonica, adding his voice to the international debate over NN.
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Some other national authorities have also manifested their position. A remarkable case of breach of NN in Germany was when T-Mobile, the largest German mobile telecommunication company, announced on 2 April 2009 that it was blocking Skype. The Dutch parliament has adopted a resolution in which it calls for a neutral Internet. France has already begun its consultation and the French government is also studying the question, having commissioned a report on the subject in April 2010.
In addition, three cases recently hit the news as possible breaches of NN. In February 2010, the lower house of the French parliament passed a bill that imposes major controls on Internet traffic, justifying these on the ground of security and control of digital crime. A similar law has also been proposed and is being discussed in Germany
18
. Similar concerns were raised in Italy by advocates of the neutrality of the network at only few days of distance. The first case involved three Google Video executives that were found guilty of infringement of the Italian privacy law for not blocking the publication of a video portraying a disabled being harassed by school mates 19 . The reaction of the company was obviously very vehement and underlined the burden that such a ruling would impose on Internet platforms in providing content online. A government bill was also at the centre of intense debate as it proposed to apply the same rules of traditional television to online video providers 20 . The substantially unclear text of the proposed bill did not allow understanding how it would affect the business of professional video content providers.
Market Conditions in the US and the EU
In the mid-nineties, Internet access in the US and the EU was primarily accomplished by means of dial-up and leased lines. In the US, the Telecommunications Act of 1996 aimed to introduce more competition into the local telecommunications sector. To achieve that, facilities-based network operators were required to make their facilities available to competitors on terms no less favourable than those on which they self-supplied the same capabilities, and thus competitors made extensive use of those facilities. At one point, there were more than 7,000 ISPs in the US. The market for Internet access seemed highly competitive so that there was little concern about deviations from network neutrality.
In the past decade, broadband Internet access has grown rapidly. The US is a world leader in broadband services, with more than 81 million subscribers by the end of 2009.
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Fixed high-speed connections have been increasing steadily since 2005, according to Chart 1. The growth of broadband Internet access, coupled with the collapse of the dotcom bubble and a series of deregulatory decisions shifted attention to the policy debate over network neutrality. As already mentioned, the FCC withdrew obligations that had previously applied to telecommunications network operators to make their broadband facilities available to competitors at wholesale level. This resulted in the predictable effect that most competitive operators were forced to exit the market. Alternatively, a few of the largest (including the former AT&T and WorldCom) were acquired by incumbent local exchange carriers.
At present, the US broadband market comprises three main groups: cable companies, telecommunications operators (namely those of the remaining local exchange carriers providing ADSL, such as AT&T, Verizon, Qwest) and alternative competing carriers.
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As a matter of fact, the US broadband market is dominated by cable operators and local phone companies, which together controlled about 98 percent of broadband service at 21 OECD Broadband statistics. 22 Alternative carriers offer services over copper, fixed wireless, optical fibre, satellite and power-line.
year-end 2005 (of which cable modem represented 58%, ADSL represented 40%, and all other technologies represented 2%). Although this percentage tends to decline over time, cable and telecom operators have still maintained a majority market share. At year-end 2008, of the 86 million residential high-speed connections, cable modem represented 40.6% and ADSL represented 29.6%, as illustrated by Chart 2. 23 Since each of the phone companies and each of the cable companies has a discrete geographic coverage area, in any given part of the country the market is largely fought over by one local phone company and one cable company, creating a series of local duopolies. Consequently, real consumer choice is limited. Another notable feature of the US broadband market is that cable modem technology has been largely developed. The cable industry has invested more than USD 100 billion over the last decade in making broadband available to 95% of all US households. During 2008, the US cable companies collectively retained their lead in terms of broadband market share, as cable modem subscriber growth exceeded DSL subscriber growth in 2008.
The European environment, however, is strikingly different. There is far less presence of cable television across Europe as a whole, although DSL appears to be gradually losing its status as the preferred broadband access platform for new customers, as highlighted by In the EU, the prospects for infrastructure competition are dimmer, since only a few areas (Benelux, parts of France, Germany, and the UK) are now served by competing broadband infrastructures (Cable and ADSL). In most of the EU, it is thought that the rollout of competing broadband networks -effectively from scratch -cannot be achieved without some form of access to incumbent networks, at least in a starting phase. This means the ISP landscape in Europe looks different than in the US and is likely to remain so in the foreseeable future: fewer competing infrastructures, but more market players, many of which rely on access to the incumbent's network. In terms of NN, competitive broadband based on wholesale alternatives (bitstream access, shared access or LLU) represent meaningful competition as long as the incumbent is prevented (by technical, regulatory or contractual means) from adversely impacting the quality of the service that the competitor offers to its own end-users. As a practical matter, this means that in contrast to most Americans who have at most two meaningful alternative providers of broadband Internet access, most Europeans may have more than two viable alternative providers of broadband Internet access. How this potential competition will translate into actual competition is at the moment much less clear. Providing actual alternatives to the highest number of EU households should be one of the policy objectives of the relevant authorities. 
Regulatory Framework in the US and the EU
Historically, a key regulatory philosophy has been to regulate only where necessary to address market power. This has been accepted in both the US and the Europe. In the US, the 1996 Telecommunications Act sought to overcome the obstacles created by the lack of competition in the local loop by imposing a series of obligations on telecommunications carriers involved in local exchange. Broadband services were historically regulated differently according to the technology by which they were carried. Cable access has always been classified by the FCC as an information service and thus free of charge. In contrast, DSL was once regulated as a telecommunications service subject to unbundling requirements until 2003 when the FCC eliminated the obligation for telecom incumbents to provide shared DSL access to competitors. One of the major problems in the US has been the lack of a detailed national broadband policy that actively encourages competition among national providers. The communications law is ambiguous and increasingly irrelevant. It seems that the US has abandoned the FCC's historic pro-competitive regulatory philosophy in favour of a deregulatory, proincumbent stance.
The US regulatory authority in telecommunications is the Federal Communications Commission (FCC). However, it does not have explicit power to regulate broadband Internet service in general. As already mentioned, the FCC was questioned about its authority to impose so-called "net neutrality" obligations on the nation's largest cable TV and Internet operator Comcast. Shortly after the decision by the US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia circuit, the FCC announced in May 2010 that it will move to reclassify broadband from a largely unregulated information service to a more regulated common-carrier service under Title II of the Communications Act. But the FCC official did not say what steps the agency would take to reclassify broadband. This shows that the FCC will seek a way to ensure it has some regulatory jurisdiction over broadband.
In the EU, there is an institutional separation of power between the European Commission (EC) and the Member State National Regulatory Authorities (NRAs). The Commission seeks to harmonise the whole process across the Member States and has specific powers of veto over certain decisions, while NRAs implement the measures in their own countries. In contrast to the US, European regulators have the ability to impose non-discrimination obligations on network operators that have market power. They have authority to impose interconnection obligations, and if necessary could do so even on operators who do not possess "Significant Market Power" (SMP). 25 They also have substantial ability to protect the consumers' rights, for example by requiring network operators to disclose deviations from NN either online or in their contracts with end-users. 26 These powers to protect consumer are particularly important, in that they potentially enable NRAs to ensure informed consumer choice (Scott Marcus 2008).
In the EU, the current regulation of Electronic Communication Service (ECS) came into force in 2003 and is already subject to a debate over how it should be reformed in 2010. In addition, competition law is viewed as an ex post complement to the application of ex ante application of the ECS. To the extent that competition law addresses market failures such as tying, it provides a sophisticated alternative to regulation. Under the Directives, the Commission first establishes a list of markets where ex ante regulation is to be considered, the markets being defined according to normal competition law principles.
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These markets are then adapted and analysed by NRAs with the aim of identifying SMP (on a forward-looking basis). Pursuant to Article 16 of the Framework Directive, the regulatory framework only permits the imposition of ex ante regulation where one or more undertakings are found to have SMP (Cave & Crocioni, 2007) . Table 6 synthetically compares the US and the EU regulatory frameworks. reduces it by a third, notably eliminating most retail markets. Unlike the previous regime, markets must be defined in accordance with the principles of competition law. NRAs may vary the markets subject to objection by the Commission. Member States can also add markets, using specified (and quite exacting) procedures. 
Regulatory Concerns for the EU
The economics analysis and the overview of the internet markets provided in the previous sections seem to suggest that several regulatory concerns arise and are likely become even more relevant as the sector will keep expanding in the near future.
The European internet sector is relatively competitive when it comes to access to final users: this is in principle guaranteed by the local loop unbundling regulation mandated by the European Commission. In terms of the economic framework outlined in Section 4, it can be assumed that the final users' segment is competitive (or, at least, potentially competitive). According to the theory, however, platforms would also be able to extract from content providers the entire surplus, as the latter are interested to reach as many final users as possible. This simple observation triggers a first concern: is the current institutional setting sufficient to guarantee enough access on the content providers' side?
The concern, however, is milder if it is observed that reality may be different from what a first glance may suggest. First of all, as previously underlined, content providers are a rather heterogeneous bunch of agents and not all of them may be interested or willing to pay to multi-home. A better description of reality is that some of them actually pay other providers to use their content on websites: search engines on non-search websites are an obvious example. Moreover, in many cases ISPs have their own web portal that features content from other providers. The distinction between content providers and ISPs/platforms is more difficult to trace in reality than in theory and the relationship between these more nuanced. This is also reflected in the charges for access from ISPs to content providers, which are unlikely to even approximate the full extraction of content providers' rent predicted by theory.
Following the same lines of reasoning, it looks difficult to figure an evolution of the internet in which peer to peer agreements and the end to end principle is substituted by a preferential system based on differentiated access charges between ISPs. Even in case these scenarios materialize, the concerns may not be well grounded. Business practices aimed at screening providers' willingness to pay for a higher quality service, in fact, are likely to have a positive effect for most of the players involved: discriminatory access charges should encourage investment in quality of the network and a higher participation of content providers. The effect on web's users is, however, less clear cut and it may raise concerns that deserve some attention from the regulator. As discussed in some detail below, however, this type of concerns may be often more effectively addressed by competition policy rather than "ex-ante" regulation.
As the expansionary trend of the internet industry does not seem to slow down, the increase in participation on both sides of the market raises the question of whether the current infrastructure allows efficient traffic management. Quality discrimination would make this effect more pronounced, encouraging increased participation of both content providers and final users. Increased incentives to innovate of content providers may also magnify problems of congestion. In presence of major traffic disruptions and congestion two scenarios look possible, one more likely in the long run and the other one in the short run. The increased profits of telecom companies owning the network should encourage them to invest and extend their infrastructure. This would reduce the likelihood and the incidence of congestion on the network. Investment, however, does not take place instantly: between investment decisions and their materialization, there is always a physiological lag. In the meanwhile, the immediate response from ISPs could be to prioritize traffic according to queuing rules. The transparency of those rules may not be crystalline: the danger is that claims of congestion may hide unfair competitive practices. The issue surely deserves a careful regulatory analysis and a prompt response in due course.
Ex ante vs. ex post Regulation
Both the US and the EC have relied on a combination of ex ante and ex post remedies to control market power in the telecommunications, i.e. sector-specific regulators usually intervene ex ante, while competition authorities act ex post. Generally speaking, ex ante economic regulation only makes sense in those markets where structural competition problems persist. In the markets opened to competition, ex ante regulation is too blunt an instrument to distinguish between vigorous competition and anticompetitive acts. At present, it is generally accepted that regulatory intervention should remain minimal and limited to ex post intervention in case of anticompetitive practices, as ex ante regulation, particularly in markets opened to competition, necessarily imposes costs on society.
The NN debate is something about pros and cons of ex ante and ex post regulation. Some advocate ex ante regulatory authority to promote NN, as this is the only way to guarantee openness to Internet. In addition, antitrust enforcement is burdensome and slow, making it difficult to apply to a fast-changing technological world. In contrast to this view, opponents argue any ex ante regulation in the sense of net neutrality will cause huge cost and harm economic and social benefits. Many economists regard access tiering as a potentially harmful practice that may require regulation in the future. However, until economic harm has been demonstrated, they believe that proscriptive ex ante regulation is not warranted. Therefore, there is no need for NN regulation at all but rather an effective competition policy that guarantees a sufficient level of competition.
Witnessing the increasingly effective competition in the telecoms markets, the EC has showed their favour of abandoning sector-specific regulation. In the meantime, they aim to concentrate regulation on the markets with growing competition problems, such as access to high speed broadband services. Consequently, the Commission has revised its recommendation on the relevant markets. Eleven of the former eighteen regulated markets (Recommendation of 2003) will no longer be subject to ex ante regulation and will be made subject to ex post regulation. In practice, this means that general competition law will apply to those markets.
Policy recommendations
In the near future, the debate on network neutrality is likely to become more and more heated on the eastern side of the Atlantic. Our previous analysis presented the basics of the EU regulatory setting, of the concerns posed by the structure of the internet sector.
In the light of these and the policy instruments available, we would like to present an overview of the policy scenarios that a national regulator may face in the near future. Kocsis and de Bijl (2007) outline three possible alternative regulatory scenarios as the outcome of the net neutrality debate. On one extreme, if the hands-off party prevails, the market is left in charge reducing the regulatory interference to the minimum. Several sources of welfare losses may arise in such a situation: we stressed issues related to investment incentives, in presence or not of congestion, and uncompetitive discrimination and access blocking. At the other extreme stands an extensive network neutral regulation of the sector which would ban access-tiering or, even more strongly, any type of termination charge and similar arrangements. Given the state of research on network neutrality, characterized by non-conclusive theoretical results and rather limited empirical evidence, the risk of a regulatory failure seems concrete. That would possibly impose more important social costs than no regulation at all. An intermediary type of solution may be relying on interoperability requirements that impose rather limited obligations on ISP operators. Interoperability requirements on ISPs postulated by ex-ante regulation have two major advantages. The first is to directly tackle what seems to be the major problem of the future internet: the possibility of unfair and anti-competitive discrimination of content providers by ISPs. The second advantage is that the burden of proof would be transferred from the content provider (or the damaged final users) to the ISP. This seems efficient on the grounds that the data on traffic may be private information of ISPs and unlikely to be available or disclosed to second parties, especially to commercial rivals 28 .
As suggested by our analysis, the type of discrimination the regulator should be the most concerned with is particularly likely to happen in presence of congestion. Congestion has not been up to now a major problem on the internet and only local and limited episodes are reported: it may become a very relevant issue, however, in presence of an increased number of internet users and content providers, the diffusion of bandwidth intensive applications and flat rate pricing from ISPs. Yoo (2006) underlines the features of the internet that make of it a "club good": once an individual gets access, his cost of usage does not fully reflect the cost imposed to other users, inviting overconsumption. Transaction costs, however, make it difficult for ISP to charge users and providers according to their consumption of bandwidth. The widespread diffusion of flat contracts also makes it difficult to move back to metered pricing, as that would inflict a further psychological cost on users. The adoption of regulatory restrictions may then have to be considered in presence of risks of congestion. One possible solution to the problem is to allow discrimination on the end-users side rather than on the content providers' side. While the latter would increase entry on the internet, the former could be designed by a last mile provider in a way that even a flat rate contract imposes end-users an economically efficient bandwidth use. The flat rate access fee can, in fact, be set equal to the average congestion cost inflicted to the system by the average user. This solution, however, may not be as effective in the EU. The LLU provision of the EC imposes to ISPs to resell bandwidth and allow entry of other ISPs. This is increasing competition; but in case competitive forces target on prices and access charges, the efficient anti-congestion access fee may not be sustainable in equilibrium. The market may not, then, deliver the desired outcome and a regulatory intervention is needed to tackle congestion. Home networking or, in other words, the number of computers that can access the internet through the same connection may have to be capped.
Similarly, in presence of a monopolist last mile provider, home networking would imply a raised flat access fee on end users: this would penalize low volume users that are either excluded of the internet or pay an access fee that cross-subsidizes multiple users. Eventual restrictions in presence of congestion do not need to materialize in bans, which would obviously be undesirable and anti-competitive. A more efficient option is to let the last mile ISP price discriminate end-users desiring to home network: the instrument used is a price premium for networking connections.
Bandwidth can be used indiscriminately for other purposes that may cause congestion. These are the use of devices such as internet phones, gaming consoles and Wi-Fi rooters. The ability to act as a file server (as, for example, in peer-to-peer file sharing) and the use of the internet for commercial uses are also bandwidth intensive activities. Increased price discrimination can prove an efficient management tool also in these cases.
The effectiveness of ISPs price discrimination, as underlined, may be jeopardized in presence of price focused competition: actual or potential entrants may reduce the charges that ISPs can impose at the last mile, not allowing a privately effective response to congestion concerns. The regulator may then need to act directly. Examples of intervention to tackle congestion problems are the enforcement of price premia. The imposition of this instrument can effectively target home networking, the use of attached devices and even the possibility for a user to act as a file server.
The policies just discussed have their limitations. The anti-congestion policies outlined, for example, may lead ISPs to mask undesirable anti-competitive discrimination behind the need of prioritizing traffic. Furthermore, focusing on reducing the traffic rather than extending the network may deter investment for the improvement and extension of the infrastructure, a desirable long run goal. These are sound concerns and they lead us to the following conclusion. The policies discussed may be effective and should be adopted only under three important qualifications: the first is that congestion of the last mile constitutes a primary problem of network management; the second is that the restrictions imposed are contingent and temporary; the third is the presence of an active competition authority which invigilates and can guarantee the rights of content providers and final users in presence of unfair discrimination.
All the possible scenarios outlined in the previous discussion and the policy suggestions are summarized in Table 7 . 
Conclusions
The Internet has been developing at a very fast rate in the past two decades. In particular, the broadband technology, with faster speed of delivery of data packets and the characteristic of being provided mostly bundled with other services (i.e. telephone or cable TV), allows network owners to potentially discriminate between content providers at a much reduced cost. This technological possibility has evoked a heated debate over the question of whether the network owners should be allowed to apply different treatment to data packets associated with different services, applications, destinations or devices. Concerns of anticompetitive behaviour from Internet service providers (ISPs) call for the so called NN regulation. NN has been a contentious topic since its appearance in the policy debate. On the one hand, opponents of NN, such as many ISPs like Verizon and AT&T in the US, Telefonica in Spain, argue that they should be able to profit from their investments and platform discrimination is necessary for future innovation on the Internet. On the other hand, proponents of NN, such as consumer groups and many content providers like Google, Yahoo!, eBay, Amazon, believe that platform discrimination will block competition and distort content providers' innovation incentives.
The lack of consensus regarding NN regulation has been reflected by the different responses from the two sides of the Atlantic. The US are very different from the EU in terms of both market conditions and of the regulatory (and competition law) environment. In the US, it is much more likely that the ISP is affiliated to the network access provider than in Europe. This is because the degree of access regulation for broadband access in the US is currently lower than in Europe where, often because of access obligations, the retail ISP is not the wholesale network provider. Therefore, much of the push for network neutrality rules in the US comes from the lack of competition in broadband services. As most consumers only have a choice of two providers -a national provider and a regional competitor, the FCC is under more pressure to act on such issues. In contrast to the US, despite the far less presence of cable television across Europe as a whole, the ISPs market seems effectively competitive and most Europeans have more than two viable alternative providers of broadband Internet access. In addition, already existing policy tools, e.g. Competition Law, appear in prospect sufficiently effective.
In this paper, we have analysed the main economic issues behind the NN debate in a two-sided market framework. In addition, we have compared the market conditions and regulatory framework both in the US and in the EU. The final goal was to discuss and evaluate, in the light of the economic principles, some possible concrete regulation proposals.
The analysis, in fact, provides important policy implications. The main conclusion is that the main concerns for a European policy-maker should be: 1) unfair and anticompetitive discrimination; 2) the possibility of congestion. Both of the previous may lead to an undesirable fragmentation of the internet. To make things worse, in presence of 2), the undesirable practices like 1) may find sound justification from offending ISPs. For example, discrimination that harms access to the content of a rival business or slows down in the internet traffic may be justified on grounds of traffic prioritization to avoid congestion. "Ex-ante" regulation may still constitute an effective solution if limited in scope and extent and contingent to the challenges proposed by network management.
In this light, regulation should mandate ISPs to guarantee interoperability and a smooth flow of the traffic over the internet. A similar provision would have the advantage of transferring, in a dispute, the burden of proof on the ISPs, the informationally strong party. At this stage more stringent network neutrality regulation should be avoided as the risk of regulatory failure would be quite high.
The structure of the internet market, its dynamics and some institutional characteristics do not rule out the possibility of non-negligible congestion problems to arise in the future. In presence of congestion, further regulatory intervention may be needed. Competition at the last mile, as protected by the EC rules, may not help manage congestion effectively as two or more ISPs share the same infrastructure. Other type of restrictions might then have to be adopted; for example, limitations on attaching bandwidth intensive devices, on home networking and on the ability to operate file servers. These limitations would affect the end-users who are high volume users of the internet. As long as the limitations are not selectively imposed to harm a specific content provider, causing indirectly uncompetitive discrimination on the content's side of the market, they can be an efficient network management tool of congestion.
The final message of our work is that ex-ante regulation should be completed as much as possible by an effective ex-post regulation in the internet sector: Europe and its member countries, given their institutional setting, are in the best conditions to achieve this goal.
In that case, a network neutral regulation could be limited to very few relevant provisions so that an increase in the efficiency of the system could be matched by a lower risk of regulatory failure. 
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